



# **Engineering Safety- and Security-Related Requirements for Software-Intensive Systems**

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Software Engineering Institute  
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# Three Disciplines:

*Requirements, Safety, and Security  
Engineering*

# Three Related Disciplines

## Safety Engineering

the engineering discipline within systems engineering concerned with lowering the risk of *unintentional unauthorized* harm to valuable assets to a level that is acceptable to the system's stakeholders by preventing, detecting, and reacting to such harm, mishaps (i.e., accidents and incidents), hazards, vulnerabilities, and safety risks

## Security Engineering

the engineering discipline within systems engineering concerned with lowering the risk of *intentional unauthorized* harm to valuable assets to a level that is acceptable to the system's stakeholders by preventing, detecting, and reacting to such harm, misuses (i.e., attacks and incidents), threats, vulnerabilities, and security risks

## Requirements Engineering

the engineering discipline within systems/software engineering concerned with identifying, analyzing, reusing, specifying, managing, verifying, and validating goals and requirements (including safety- and security-related requirements)





# Challenges:

*Combining Requirements, Safety, and Security Engineering*

# Challenges<sub>1</sub>

Requirements engineering, safety engineering, and security engineering have different:

- *Communities*
- *Disciplines* with different training, books, journals, and conferences
- *Professions* with different *job titles*
- Fundamental underlying *concepts* and *terminologies*
- *Tasks, techniques, and tools*

Safety and security engineering are:

- Typically treated as *secondary specialty engineering disciplines*
- Performed separately from, largely independently of, and lagging behind the primary engineering workflow:  
(requirements, architecture, design, etc.)

# Challenges<sub>2</sub>

Current separate methods for performing requirements, safety, and security engineering are inefficient and ineffective.

Separation of requirements engineering, safety engineering, and security engineering:

- Causes *poor* safety- and security-related requirements that are often:
  - Vague/unverifiable/unfeasible architectural and design constraints
  - Capabilities or goals rather than requirements
  - Inadequate and too late to drive architecture development and test planning
- Makes it unnecessarily difficult to achieve certification and accreditation for safe/secure operations

# Challenges<sub>3</sub>

Poor requirements are a primary cause of more than half of all project failures (defined in terms of):

- Major Cost Overruns
- Major Schedule Overruns
- Major Functionality not delivered
- Cancelled Projects
- Delivered Systems that are never used

Poor requirements are a major root cause of many (or most) accidents involving software-intensive systems.

Security ‘requirements’ often mandated (e.g., Industry Best Practices, Security Functions)

- Often, these are not derived into meaningful requirements at the engineering level

# Challenges<sub>4</sub>

Constant tension: How safe and secure is safe and secure *enough*?


What is needed:

- Better consistency between safety and security engineering
  - More consistent concepts and terminology
  - Reuse of techniques across disciplines
  - Less unnecessary overlap and avoidance of redundant work
- Better collaboration:
  - Between safety and security engineering
  - With requirements engineering
- Better safety- and security-related requirements




# Fundamental Concepts: *A Foundation for Understanding*

# Quality Model



# Quality Characteristics (External)



# Defensibility<sub>1</sub>

## Defensibility


the quality characteristic capturing the degree to which the system:

- Properly prevents, detects, reacts to, and adapts to:
  - Unintended and unauthorized *harm* to *valuable assets* due to the occurrence of
  - *Abuses* enabled by the existence of
  - *Dangers*
- Has *defensibility risks* that are acceptably low to its *stakeholders*
- Valuable Assets may be people, organizations, property, services, or environments
- Harm may be direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, authorized or unauthorized



# Defensibility<sub>2</sub>

Safety and security aspects of defensibility are defined in a similar manner by replacing:



- Abuse with either mishap (safety) or misuse (security)
- Danger with either hazard (safety) or threat (security)
- Defensibility risks with safety risks and security risks

# Safety- and Security-Related Requirements

# There's More Than One Type


Too often, only a single type of requirements is considered when there are many types that need consideration:

- Special non-functional requirements:
  - Safety and security requirements are quality requirements
- Safety- and security-*significant* requirements (functional, data, and interface)
- Safety and security functions/subsystems requirements
- Safety and security *constraints*:
  - Architectural and design constraints
  - Mandated defensibility controls (i.e., safeguards and countermeasures)

Separation of safety/security/requirements engineering almost assures gaps in requirements

Gaps in Requirements Lead to Shortcomings in Delivered Systems

# Four Types of Defensibility-Related Requirements



# Example Safety- and Security-Related Requirements

## Safety / Security Requirement

“When in mode V, the system shall limit the occurrence of *accidental harm* of type W to valuable assets of type X to an average rate of no more than Y asset value per Z time duration.”

“When in mode X, the system shall *detect misuses* of type Y an average of at least Z percent of the time.”

## Safety / Security Significant Requirement

“The system shall automatically transport passengers between stations.”

“The system shall enable users to update their personal information.”

## Safety / Security Function / Subsystem Requirement

“The system shall include a fire detection and suppression subsystem.”

“The system shall support the encryption/decryption of sensitive data.”

## Safety / Security Constraint


“The system shall not contain any of the hazardous materials in Table X.”

“The system shall use passwords for user authentication.”



# Collaboratively Engineering Safety- & Security-Related Requirements

# Stovepipes are Typical...



# A Better Way

Ensure close collaboration among Safety, Security, and Requirements Teams

Better Integrate Safety and Security Methods:

- Concepts and Terminology
- Techniques and Work Products
- Provide Cross Training


Better Integrate Safety and Security Methods with Requirements Methods:

- Early during Development Cycle
- Clearly define Team Responsibilities
- Provide Cross Training


Develop all types of Safety- and Security-related Requirements

Ensure that these Requirements have appropriate Properties

# An Overall Defensibility Engineering Method



# Defensibility Analysis → Reqs Engineering



# Conclusion

# Summary

Engineering safety- and security-related requirements requires appropriate  
Concepts / Methods / Techniques & Tools / Expertise

These must come from the respective experts in:

- Requirements engineering (safety- and security-related requirements)
- Safety engineering (analysis and safety goals)
- Security engineering (analysis and security goals)

BUT, Requirements/Safety/Security Engineering need to be:

- Properly interwoven.
- Consistent with each other.
- Performed collaboratively and in parallel (i.e., overlapping in time).

A collaborative process will advance Safety and Security Engineering to 1<sup>st</sup> class efforts

Ultimately, collaboration will improve the safety and security aspects of delivered systems

# Contact Information

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
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
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# Backup


# Defensibility Quality Attributes




# Unauthorized Harm to Valuable Assets




# Types of Harm




# Types of Abuses




# Types of Abusers




# Vulnerabilities




# Dangers




# Defensibility Risks




# Risk in terms of Software Degree of Control




# Types of Requirements




# Types of Defensibility-Related Requirements




# Systems Analysis




# Asset Analysis




# Abuse (Misuse and Mishap) Analysis




# Vulnerability Analysis




# Abuser Analysis




# Danger Analysis



# Defensibility Risk Analysis



# Defensibility Significance Analysis



# Defense Analysis

